Iran opens Strait of Hormuz transit to commercial ships for 60 days, citing Islamabad memorandum

On the evening of 20 June 2026, the Iranian navy published a 60-day administrative opening of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping, paired with a new rulebook that obliges vessels to file passage applications at least 48 hours before arrival. The text, circulated via Iranian state-aligned channels including Press TV, Tasnim, Fars and Mehr, frames the window as a goodwill gesture tied to an "Islamabad memorandum" with the United States, and as a relief from the closure that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps navy announced only hours earlier. The contradiction at the heart of the day is a story in itself: by Saturday evening in Tehran, Iran had both shut the strait and begun publishing procedures for how to keep transiting it.

The sequence of declarations, recounted across Al Jazeera English, France 24, Reuters and the New York Times, runs in tight order. On Saturday afternoon, the IRGC navy issued a statement that the Strait of Hormuz was closed, that ships should not approach, and that their safety would otherwise be at risk; a translation carried by the Abuali channel quoted the Guards as saying they were "no longer bound by any commitment or agreement related to the opening of shipping lanes or to any other understanding." The US military, reported by Reuters and The Spectator Index on Telegram, said the strait remained open and that American forces were monitoring it to keep it that way. President Donald Trump, in remarks relayed by Al Jazeera and the Abuali channel, said Iran would not be permitted to charge Hormuz tolls but added that the United States itself might. By late evening, Iran had posted a 60-day transit procedure to its official feeds, and Iranian negotiators had landed in Zurich for talks with Vice President J.D. Vance on Sunday.

What the rulebook actually says

The document reproduced by Press TV, Tasnim and Fars is short, administrative and conspicuously incomplete. Commercial ships are told to lodge passage applications no fewer than 48 hours before reaching the strait, and to expect that "for 60 days, no payments will" be levied, the sentence ending mid-clause in the version that circulated on Telegram. The text does not name a responsible authority within the Iranian navy or the Ports and Maritime Organisation, does not specify the receiving office for applications, does not state a response window, and does not explain what happens to a vessel that arrives inside the 48-hour deadline. Where a normal notice to mariners would carry an IMO reference, a chart correction number and a contact email, the Iranian text carries a politics.

That asymmetry matters. A 48-hour pre-arrival filing requirement is, on its face, a routine harbour-control measure, the sort of rule a coastal state can impose on the high seas under innocent passage and transit passage doctrines codified in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Imposing it for a 60-day window, without a published schedule of fees and without naming a desk that will process the application, is something else: it is a discretionary choke point in which Iranian authorities retain the power to approve or refuse each hull on a case-by-case basis. The instrument is therefore closer to a permission regime than to a fee regime, even though the suspension of fees for 60 days reads as the headline concession.

The Islamabad memorandum and the Swiss track

The text frames the 60-day opening as flowing from an "Islamabad memorandum" between Iran and the United States, language that recurs across Tasnim, Fars, al-Alam and Press TV. The diplomatic choreography behind that phrase is now visible in two movements. The first is the Swiss track: the New York Times reported that the next phase of US–Iran talks is expected to begin on Sunday in Switzerland; CNN, cited by the Sprinter account on X, said Vice President Vance would travel to Switzerland for the negotiations; and the Cuban outlet Debate reported that the Iranian delegation, led by parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, had arrived in Zurich by Saturday evening. The second is the Islamabad track: al-Alam and Tasnim both reported that Pakistani prime minister Shahbaz Sharif had travelled to Switzerland to "follow up on the implementation of the memorandum," with a parallel Jahan Tasnim report adding that Pakistan's army chief, General Asim Munir, was also part of the Pakistani presence in Zurich. The implication of the state-aligned messaging is that Islamabad is positioning itself as custodian of whatever deal emerges, and that the strait text is best read as a confidence-building deliverable inside that architecture rather than as a unilateral Iranian concession.

What the memorandum actually contains has not been published. What has been published, in addition to the 60-day rulebook, is the set of conditions under which Iran says the opening could collapse. The IRGC navy's earlier Saturday statement tied the closure to "Israel's military campaign in Lebanon," language carried by France 24 and amplified on the Abuali channel. Israeli operations in southern Lebanon, including a new IDF-designated red and yellow line that places the Ali al-Taher ridge and Majdal Zoun under Israeli control, have moved onto the same timeline as the Hormuz decision. The Trump administration's framing, as relayed by Al Jazeera, is that the US–Iran memorandum does not rule out future tolls in the strait after the initial 60-day window, which leaves open the question of what happens on day 61.

Reading the day without the war-games vocabulary

Western wire coverage, in this cycle, has tended to treat Iranian administrative moves in the strait as inseparable from escalation risk, a frame visible in France 24's headline "Iran says closed Strait of Hormuz as US deal hits obstacle" and in Al Jazeera's "Overplaying Strait of Hormuz card will turn Iran into a pariah state." The Iranian text itself supports a narrower reading, not because Tehran's behaviour is benign but because the instrument on the table is administrative rather than martial. Publishing a passage procedure is the opposite move from mining the channel, and the simultaneous arrival of a 48-hour pre-arrival rulebook alongside a rhetoric of closure is more consistent with managed coercion than with a decision to deny transit outright. The IRGC statement warned ships away; the rulebook told them how to come back. Both can be true, and both are.

The gaps in the published text are themselves the story, and they will be the story for the next 60 days. There is no named Iranian officer responsible for processing applications. There is no published response window. There is no schedule of fees, which leaves the "no payments" suspension as an unenforceable grace period unless a tariff schedule is published before day 61. There is no IMO reference number, which means commercial insurers and flag-state registries will be issuing their own advisories in the gap. And there is no explicit reference to the Islamabad memorandum as a treaty-text, which means the document's legal weight is, for now, whatever Tehran and Washington choose to claim it is on any given Sunday morning in Zurich.

What to watch between now and day 61

Three dates will tell us whether the 60-day window is a thaw or a trap. The first is Sunday's talks in Switzerland, where Vance and Qalibaf will meet against the backdrop of renewed Israeli operations in southern Lebanon; the New York Times reports the next phase is "expected to begin" on Sunday, which is a careful phrase. The second is the publication, or non-publication, of a tariff schedule by Iran's Ports and Maritime Organisation; if a fee table appears, Trump's claim that Iran will not charge tolls has been overridden by Iranian bureaucratic practice, and the memorandum has been narrowed. The third is the Israeli military tempo in Lebanon, which Iran's own messaging identifies as the trigger that could collapse the window; a serious Hezbollah-area operation in the next fortnight would put the 60-day clock in direct conflict with the rhetorical clock that started it.

For commercial shipping, the practical effect from Monday is that any vessel planning to transit Hormuz after about 22 June must have filed its 48-hour application through whatever channel the Iranian text eventually clarifies, and must be sailing under instructions that acknowledge the possibility, articulated by Trump and reported by Al Jazeera, that the United States itself might collect a toll on the same water. Two flags over one chokepoint, two administrations issuing notices, and a Pakistani delegation in Zurich carrying a memorandum nobody has read. The strait is open in the only sense that matters for now, which is that ships can still pass. The politics of how they pass is still being written.

Sources

• https://t.me/presstv, Iranian state television English channel, Telegram publication of the 60-day passage rulebook, 20 June 2026.
• https://t.me/tasnimnews_en, Tasnim News Agency (Iranian state-aligned), English Telegram, 60-day procedure text and coverage of PM Sharif's travel to Switzerland, 20 June 2026.
• https://t.me/alalamfa, Al-Alam (Iranian state-affiliated Arabic-English), Telegram, 60-day procedure and Sharif Switzerland travel, 20 June 2026.
• https://t.me/farsna, Fars News Agency (Iranian state-aligned), Telegram, 60-day passage procedure text, 20 June 2026.
• https://t.me/mehrnews, Mehr News Agency (Iranian state-aligned), Telegram, 60-day passage procedure text, 20 June 2026.
• Al Jazeera English via https://t.me/aljazeeraglobal, Telegram, "Trump vows Iran will not charge Strait of Hormuz tolls, but says US might" and related headline posts, 20 June 2026.
• France 24 English via https://t.me/france24_en, Telegram, "Iran says closed Strait of Hormuz as US deal hits obstacle ahead of Swiss talks," 20 June 2026.
• https://t.me/englishabuali, Iranian political commentary channel, Telegram, IRGC navy closure statement and Trump toll remarks, 20 June 2026.
• Reuters via X (https://x.com/reuters), "US forces monitoring Strait of Hormuz to ensure it stays open," 20 June 2026.
• New York Times, "U.S. and Iranian Officials to Meet for Peace Talks in Switzerland," 20 June 2026.
• https://t.me/JahanTasnim, Tasnim-affiliated analysis channel, Telegram, on Sharif and Asim Munir participation in Iran–US track, 20 June 2026.
• https://t.me/CubaDebate, Cuban state outlet, Telegram, Iranian delegation arrival in Zurich, 20 June 2026.
• https://t.me/osintlive, Open-source intelligence aggregator, Telegram, carrying The Spectator Index on US military position, 20 June 2026.

Desk note: Monexus has leaned on the official Iranian text as carried by state-aligned channels, and has not relied on the framing of any single wire. Western coverage of the strait has, in recent cycles, tended to treat Iranian administrative moves as inseparable from escalation risk; the documentary record here supports a narrower reading. What is missing, namely the application procedure, the named officer responsible, and the response window, is itself the story, and this publication will return to it.