Tehran releases draft of a 14-point US-Iran memorandum: what is on the table, and what is not

Tehran put a draft 14-point US-Iran memorandum into the public record this week, and the omissions in the document are doing more talking than the points themselves. According to reporting carried by Reuters and tracked across Polymarket signal on 14 June, the text Iran is circulating contains an oil sanctions waiver, limits on its nuclear programme, and a release of frozen Iranian assets, with a Polymarket contract pricing a 71 percent chance that President Donald Trump agrees to the asset-release demand by 30 June. Iranian outlets aligned with the negotiating team, including the English-language channels operated by analysts with close ties to Tehran's diplomatic circle, published the draft within hours of the framework being floated in Muscat.

The headline gap between the two capitals is now a single document. Trump said on 14 June, in remarks captured by Cointelegraph, that a US-Iran deal "could be signed today," while the same wire cycle recorded Tehran replying that no final decision had been made. Trump's earlier post on Truth Social announcing the memorandum of understanding would be signed the following day did not survive the day. The result is a familiar shape: the American side talks in scheduled signing ceremonies, the Iranian side talks in published text.

What is in the draft

The Iranian version of the memorandum, as summarised by Reuters and re-circulated by Unusual Whales on 14 June, runs to 14 points and is built around three pillars. The first is an oil sanctions waiver that would let Iranian crude move more freely through Asian buyers and through a Strait of Hormuz transit corridor that has been a pressure point for tanker traffic since the 12-day war in June 2025. The second is a set of nuclear limits that, on the Iranian telling, sit closer to the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action architecture of 2015 than to the maximum-pressure position that defined Trump's first term. The third is a phased release of frozen Iranian assets, a demand Tehran has carried into every round since 2018 and which the Polymarket contract currently rates as the single most likely item Trump will concede.

What is missing is at least as informative. The Iranian draft does not, on the published record, address the fate of Iran's ballistic missile programme, the status of Iranian-linked militias operating from Iraq, Syria and Yemen, or the treatment of Iranian nationals currently held in US custody. There is no published text on the future of Iran's domestic enrichment capacity beyond the JCPOA-era ceilings, and no reference to the snapback mechanism that, under UN Security Council resolution 2231, can be triggered if Iran is judged in non-compliance. Tehran has historically viewed snapback as an instrument of leverage rather than enforcement; its silence in this draft is consistent with that posture.

Why the Iranian outlet is the one publishing

Most of the substantive reporting on the text has flowed through Iranian-aligned channels rather than the State Department briefing room. The reason is procedural. Iran's negotiating team treats the release of draft text as a domestic legitimacy move, a way to show hardliners in parliament and the Islamic Republic's broader security establishment that nothing irreversible has been conceded before signatures are inked. American negotiators, by contrast, treat any draft released before a final document as not a draft but a leak, and their default response is silence.

The asymmetry is consequential. When an Iranian outlet publishes the text, the world reads Tehran's interpretation of what was agreed. When the State Department does not publish, the world reads Washington's silence. The result, in this cycle, is that Iran's framing of the 14 points has set the agenda in Gulf capitals and in European foreign ministries, while the US side is still trying to shape the narrative around whether the document will be signed at all.

What the markets are pricing

The Polymarket order book for the by-30-June question is the most honest summary of where the deal stands. The probability that Trump agrees to unfreeze Iranian assets is currently 71 percent. The probability that he agrees across the package as a whole sits closer to 50 percent, a gap that itself is information: traders believe the asset-release demand is the path of least resistance, and that the more contested items, principally nuclear architecture and sanctions architecture, will be renegotiated, deferred, or fudged. Cointelegraph quoted crypto analyst Michaël van de Poppe arguing that a signed deal would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and pull liquidity back into risk-on assets. That framing is consistent with how Tehran wants its crude exports priced in any settlement: as a global supply event, not a regional one.

The interesting number is the 21-point spread between the partial-deal contract and the all-in contract. It is the gap between what Trump can deliver this month and what Iran's full ask would require of him. Closing that gap is the negotiating problem for the next two weeks.

What is not on the table

Three items that have been central to earlier rounds are absent from the Iranian draft as published. First, the missile file: Iran's ballistic inventory, including the Khorramshahr and Sejjil classes that featured in the 2024 strikes, is not addressed. Second, the proxy file: Iraqi, Syrian, Yemeni and Lebanese armed factions aligned with the Islamic Republic are not named. Third, the human-rights file: Iranian dual nationals held by Tehran, who have historically been used as bargaining chips in nuclear negotiations, are not referenced.

Each of these omissions is a deliberate choice. Tehran does not want the missile file inside the same envelope as the nuclear file, because the missile programme is the deterrent against an Israeli strike and is not, in the Islamic Republic's reading, negotiable with Washington at all. The proxy file is similarly treated as sovereign. And the human-rights file is one Tehran has used to extract concessions from European governments separately, and has no interest in consolidating into a single American document. The 14 points that Iran has published are the points Iran is willing to put on the table. The rest are still in the room.

The signature problem

The remaining question is procedural rather than substantive. Trump said on 14 June that the memorandum could be signed the same day, and the Polymarket contract suggests the market believes he will move on the asset-release pillar by 30 June. Tehran, through its published channels, says no final decision has been made. The two statements are not actually in contradiction. They describe different documents: a Trump-era memorandum of understanding that runs to the easier points and a Tehran-era 14-point draft that runs to the harder ones. The signature problem is whether the two sides can agree that they have signed the same paper.

That is the story to watch through the back half of June. The text is public. The omissions are public. The market is public. What is not yet public is whether Washington and Tehran are negotiating the same document.

Sources

• Reuters via Unusual Whales: Iran says draft US deal includes oil sanctions waiver, nuclear limits and asset release (14 June 2026). https://t.me/unusual_whales
• Cointelegraph: Trump says Iran peace deal to be signed Sunday, contradicting Tehran (14 June 2026). https://t.me/Cointelegraph
• Polymarket: What Iranian demands will Trump agree to by June 30? (14 June 2026). https://polymarket.com/event/what-iranian-demands-will-trump-agree-to-by-june-30
• Euronews wire (Telegram): https://t.me/euronews/
• English Abu Ali (Telegram, Iranian-aligned analysis): https://t.me/englishabuali/
• Abu Ali Express (Telegram, Iranian-aligned analysis): https://t.me/abualiexpress/
• Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (background reference): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Comprehensive_Plan_of_Action

Desk note: the wire cycle on this story has been running almost entirely on anonymous sourcing from Washington and Gulf capitals, with Reuters providing the only named attribution of the draft's contents. Monexus has foregrounded the Iranian outlets that published the text itself, on the editorial judgment that the omissions in that text are as reportable as the points.