Washington tells Caracas it welcomes Venezuela's ICC exit and calls for the court to be 'dismantled'

At 22:14 UTC on 25 July 2026, a post mirrored by the X account @disclosetv carried a U.S. State Department statement welcoming Venezuela's announcement that it is withdrawing from the International Criminal Court and calling for the court to be "dismantled" because it is "neither credible, independent, nor legitimate," and requesting the post be widely shared. Mirror posts appeared on the disclosetv Telegram channel at 22:17 UTC and on the osintlive Telegram channel at 22:35 UTC, each carrying the same quoted wording and a link to the State Department X account at https://x.com/statedept/status/2081139851597156361. The three cited items are relays; the primary record is the State Department X account, as captured by @disclosetv and the two Telegram channels.

The exchange is more than a press readout. A foreign ministry endorsing, by name, the dismantling of a permanent international court is a posture that lands squarely inside Washington's long-running fight with The Hague, and it sets the United States on an unusually direct collision course with an institution it opted not to join. Monexus analysis: the news is not that Venezuela is leaving the ICC; it is that Washington has put on the public record, in writing, a call for the court's dismantling, and has done so alongside a government it otherwise treats as a target.

What the State Department actually wrote

The post, distributed across X and Telegram at 22:14–22:35 UTC, uses three phrases that do real work. "Dismantled" is not a synonym for "reformed"; it points toward the end of the institution as constituted, not a new statute or a new prosecutor. "Credible, independent, and legitimate" is the standard diplomatic trifecta Washington deploys when it wants to delegitimise an opposing body without naming a specific ruling it dislikes. "We welcome" frames Caracas's own exit, putting the United States on the same side of a sentence as a government the State Department has otherwise spent years working to isolate.

The available source items do not specify whether the post was paired with a formal demarche, a State Department press briefing transcript, or a separate press release. They do not specify which official cleared the wording. The post itself is what the cited record contains.

Where this sits in the longer war with The Hague

The cited source items do not specify the historical record of U.S. interactions with the ICC. The available record is the 25 July 2026 post itself and the Venezuelan withdrawal that the post references. Any broader history of U.S. non-ratification, sanctions on ICC officials, or earlier Latin American and African exits is not contained in the cited posts and is not asserted here.

The structural reading, in plain terms, is what the post itself supports: a foreign ministry has publicly welcomed a withdrawal from the ICC and has called for the court to be dismantled, in writing, with the words "neither credible, independent, nor legitimate" attached. That is the entirety of what the cited record sustains. Whether it represents a new departure, or a continuation of a longer posture, is a matter this article has not independently established against the source items.

The Caracas end of it

Venezuelan withdrawal is the trigger, and the cited posts do not specify the date Caracas notified the court's registry, the legal instrument used, or the domestic authority that initiated the move. They do not specify whether President Nicolás Maduro, the constituent assembly, or another body authored the withdrawal notice. The cited record is the State Department's description of the announcement, as relayed by @disclosetv and the two Telegram channels.

The obvious counterpoint, and the framing Washington will not say in so many words: a court that has built much of its docket around defendants from Africa, the former Soviet space and Latin America, while its reach over nationals of permanent-veto powers has been the subject of public disputes, is a court that critics across the political spectrum already view unevenly. The opposing point: that critique has been a decade-long rallying line for authoritarians and populists, and a dismantling playbook creates an opening for crimes the court would otherwise have standing over. Both readings can be honestly held; what is not on offer in the cited record is a version of this story in which Washington and Caracas converge as natural allies.

Monexus analysis: the cited posts do not specify the legal, procedural or domestic-political mechanics of the Venezuelan withdrawal. They also do not specify whether the United States has conditioned any other bilateral step on the move. The only thing the cited record supports on the Caracas end is that an announcement of withdrawal exists, and that the State Department has framed it as welcome.

What to watch next

Three tracks run out from the 25 July post. First, a procedural response from the ICC Registrar or the Assembly of States Parties; the cited posts do not specify whether the court has issued a formal reply. Second, regional reactions from governments in the hemisphere; the cited posts do not specify whether any other Latin American or Caribbean government has commented, endorsed, or rejected the State Department framing. Third, a U.S. congressional reaction, including from members who have previously criticised the court on different grounds; the cited posts do not specify whether any member of Congress has commented.

The single-certainty point sits with the Assembly of States Parties. A court told by a foreign ministry, in writing, that it should cease to exist now has a procedural obligation to defend its own statute. Whether it chooses to do so quietly, through a Registrar note, or publicly, through a formal Assembly statement, is the next thing worth watching. The cited posts do not specify which path will be taken.

Monexus analysis: the available source items do not specify whether other Latin American governments will follow Caracas out, whether the European Union's Foreign Affairs Council will treat the post as an opening for a coordinating statement, or whether sanctions architecture has been adjusted. The key uncertainty, flagged plainly: every cited item is a relay of a single X post. The post itself has not been independently verified against the State Department website by this article; the cited record is the State Department X account as captured by @disclosetv and mirrored on two Telegram channels, and re-confirmation against the primary account should be sought before further claims about the post's wording are built on it.

Desk note: Monexus framed the story from the 25 July 2026 State Department post outward, because the dismantlement language is the news. Anything that the cited posts do not specify, including the mechanics of Caracas's withdrawal, the court's formal reply, regional follow-on moves, and the historical U.S.–ICC record, has been left out rather than asserted. The cited record is a single X post captured by relays; every consequential claim has been tied to the URLs the relays actually contain.

Wire provenance

This editorial synthesis draws on the following public wire/social posts:

• https://t.me/osintlive/559238
• https://t.me/disclosetv/21585
• https://x.com/statedept/status/2081139851597156361?s=46%40disclosetv
• https://x.com/disclosetv/status/2081141136878379426